Rebuilding the Berlin Wall? by Stompfe, Philipp
Rebuilding the Berlin Wall?
Philipp Stompfe 2019-02-06T09:00:43
On 19 December 2018, the German government has passed amendments to the
German Foreign Trade and Payments Act (“AWG”) and to the German Foreign
Trade and Payment Ordinance (“AWV”) whose compatibility with European law is
highly questionable.
The structure and scope of investment review provided for under the AWG in
conjunction with the AWV is that the Federal Ministry of Economics, the competent
German authority, possesses an extensive ex-post examination competence
regarding the acquisition of shares of German companies by third-country nationals.
Of particular importance for foreign direct investments (FDI) is the screening of
sector specific and cross-sectoral investments by third-country nationals pursuant to
Sec. 55 et seq. AWV.
In this regard, the German legislator has lowered the threshold for the screening of
FDI to the acquisition of 10% of the voting rights of a German company being active
in the military and encryption sector and of German companies which are operating
in the field of critical infrastructure according to the Regulation for Identifying Critical
Infrastructure.
Lowering the threshold to the acquisition of 10% of the voting rights raises serious
concerns about its compatibility with European law, in particular with the fundamental
principle of free movement of capital pursuant to Article 63 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
In this context, the application ratio of freedom of establishment pursuant to Article
49 TFEU and free movement of capital as well as the possible existence of grounds
of justification with regards to restrictions to the scope of free movement of capital
are the pertinent questions.
Applicability of Free Movement of Capital pursuant to Article 63 TFEU
First, the competitive relationship between the freedom of establishment and the free
movement of capital needs to be addressed and must finally be determined.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), supported by legal commentators, has
been of the opinion that in certain situations the principle of free movement of
capital is superseded by the principle of freedom of establishment. In particular, the
freedom of establishment shall be lex specialis with regards to regulations which
are “intended to apply only to those shareholdings which enable the holder to exert
a definite influence on a company’s decisions and to determine its activities” (ECJ,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:707, para. 91). Furthermore, the ECJ has explained that the
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relevant shareholder must obtain a “substantial holding in the nominal capital of the
company” (ECJ, ECLI:EU:C:2007:273, para. 21).
Free movement of capital, contrary to freedom of establishment, explicitly includes
citizens and corporations of third countries in its scope of protection. Therefore, a
strict application of the previous ECJ jurisprudence would, as a direct consequence,
lead to the fact that third-country nationals would rigidly be deprived of any protection
under European law, rendering Article 63 TFEU completely meaningless.
Moreover, the intrinsic preconditions of “definite influence” and the possibility
of “determining company’s activities”, as stipulated by the ECJ, underline the
inapplicability of the relevant cases for the circumstances of the present case.
Especially with regards to German company law, the ECJ has generally linked the
aspects of “definite and dominant influence” to the acquisition of at least 25% of the
voting rights, giving the purchaser certain rights to block corporate decisions such
as amendments to the articles of association and liquidation decisions (blocking
minority).
However, does the acquisition of a blocking minority really suffice to qualify as
purchasing “definite” and “dominant” influence of a company? In any case, the
acquisition of 10% of voting rights is, as such, insufficient to assume a substantial
holding in the nominal capital of the company in the form of a controlling stake.
In addition, the existing ECJ jurisprudence on the inapplicability of free movement
of capital finds its basis exclusively in cases dealing with taxation, which does not
constitute a generalizable field of law that would then allow to prohibit third-country
nationals to acquire company shares.
As a result, I find it more convincing to apply the principle of free movement of capital
to the present case.
Grounds of Justification
The wide application of the principle of free movement of capital does not exist
without any legitimate restrictions. In particular, according to Article 65(1)(b) TFEU,
Member States are entitled to take measures which are justified on grounds of public
policy or public security. The statutory concept of public policy or public security
within the AWG and AWV explicitly refers to Article 65(1) TFEU and, hence, has to
be interpreted and applied in accordance with EU law.
In this regard, the ECJ has developed compulsory criteria which must be met in
order to justify any restrictions regarding the free movement of capital by relying on
the exemption of public policy or public security.
It should be considered, first, in accordance with the ECJ judgement Scientology,
that “public policy and public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine
and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. Moreover,
those derogations must not be misapplied so as, in fact, to serve purely economic
ends” (ECJ, ECLI:EU:C:2000:124, para. 17). Furthermore, any restrictions from the
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Member States must observe the legal principle of proportionality, legal certainty,
and predictability.
Considering the unambiguous legal framework under which the ECJ permits
restrictions to the fundamental freedom of free movement of capital it can well
be concluded that the latest amendments to the AWV are in violation of these
mandatory requirements.
The relevant provisions of the AWG and AWV merely speak of a risk for public
policy or public security without any sustainable and adequate ascertainment.
The AWV provides no reliable, precise and objective indication as to the specific
circumstances under which an acquisition by a foreign investor will be prohibited due
to the constitution of a serious risk to fundamental public interests (public policy or
public security).
Furthermore, the German government has failed to determine which capabilities
of exerting influence and which specific corporate decisions, in the context of
“definite and dominant influence” are sufficient to pose a risk to public policy or public
security. The mere reference to the definition of “critical infrastructure” according to
the Regulation for Identifying Critical Infrastructure (BSI-KritisV) does, in any event,
not suffice.
Moreover, and most importantly, the German government has not provided any
explanations why the review triggering threshold has been lowered to the acquisition
of 10% of the relevant voting rights. Why not 20%? Why not 5%?
The German government explains in its very own reasons of the current AWV
amendments that the previous legal situation of a threshold of 25% of foreign
shareholding was justified due to the foreign shareholder obtaining certain blocking
rights, as described above (blocking minority). In contrast, the German government
does not provide transparent reasons for establishing the 10% threshold.
This vagueness of providing solid reasons for the determining the 10% threshold
must be considered intentional.
However, one possible explanation might be the expansion of political judicial
competence and decision-making scope in order to ensure the compliance of third-
country acquisitions with general economic-political goals. Additionally, merely
protectionist considerations can also not be excluded. Ultimately, both potential
explanations are legally not appropriate to justify restrictions of free movement of
capital with the exemption of public policy or public security.
In addition, the ECJ has explicitly pointed out that the acquisition of 10% of shares
of a company operating in a sensitive sector or any other acquisition conferring
significant influence on such a company cannot, as a general rule, be regarded
as a real and serious enough threat to public policy or public security (ECJ,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:694, para. 69).
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The German government has constantly repeated in its political and legal statements
that the overriding aim of the various AWG and AWV amendments has been to
establish stricter review competences and to expand possible prohibition powers
with regard to the acquisition of German companies by foreign stated-owned
companies and state fonds. Therefore, the amended AWV is supposed to primarily
target only acquisitions of stated-owned companies and state fonds from outside the
European Union, in particular China. However, the permissible scope of investment
review contained within the AWG and the AWV is by no means limited to stated-
owned companies and state fonds, but is also explicitly applicable to private
companies.
Conclusion
By amending the AWV in its latest version the German government has overstepped
the mark in terms of what is needed in order to guarantee public policy or security
regarding the acquisition of German companies by third-country nationals.
Therefore, good and solid grounds exist to presume that those amendments are in
violation of fundamental principles of European law, namely the free movement of
capital.
In particular, the lack of precision under which specific circumstances an acquisition
of voting rights might be prohibited does not enable the concerned investors to be
apprised of the scope of its respective rights and obligations and, hence, constitutes
a violation of the principle of legal certainty. Furthermore, the manifestation of the
10% threshold without providing transparent reasons for it in conjunction with the
non-restriction of the screening competence to state-owned companies and state
fonds violates the principle of proportionality.
Out of a legal policy perspective Germany is expending its economic protectionism
and thereby unfortunately creating a new “Berlin Wall” for FDI. The concrete
economic implications remain to be seen.
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